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Abstract: »Die Realität anpassen. Das Kontingenzdilemma im Kontext der po-
pularisierten Praktiken der digitalen Selbstrackings von Gesundheitsdaten«. 
The practice of digital self-tracking of health data addresses inter-related 
contingencies on the micro and macro level: on the micro level, digital self-
tracking can be perceived as facilitation of lifeworld contingencies and the 
expression of the way contingency is dealt with in (socially) exhausted socie-
ties. Together, these can be understood as a strategy of the “privatization of 
contingency.” The attempt to reduce the individual’s contingency of action 
is accompanied by the increase of lifeworld contingency, resulting in a con-
tingency dilemma in contemporary self-tracking which produces (new) de-
pendencies and vulnerabilities with respect to the technology used. 
Through a multilevel analysis of digital self-tracking and an empirical study 
on vulnerable self-trackers, a number of those pathological effects of the 
contingency dilemma are examined using methods from pragmatism and 
theory of conventions, while highlighting a possible solution to this dilem-
ma. 
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1. Introduction: Contingency and Vulnerability in 
Practices of Digital Self-Tracking1 
Contingency describes what is neither necessary (the angular sum of a tri-
angle is 180°) nor impossible (squaring the circle). Richard Rorty famously 
argued for the contingency of language. Overcoming ideas of a rigorous 
scientific language to describe a determined universe, he argued for a 
recognition of the contingency of language to describe moral progress in 
arts, politics, and sciences (Rorty 1989). Questions like “Has the advance-
ment of science led us to a freer society?” can hardly be adequately ad-
dressed with the scientific language of mathematics or physics, but instead 
have to incorporate metaphors and value statements.  
This philosophic debate over the use and limits of language to describe 
our world, our society, and ourselves is reflected in modern technology of 
measurement. Like a rigorous scientific language, it aims at giving precise 
and finite information on our world. Questions like “Has the advancement 
of digital health technology led us to live better lives?” cannot, however, be 
answered by technology, but instead have to incorporate metaphors and 
value statements as well. 
The use of self-tracking is connected to the wish to lead a healthy life. Self-
tracking devices seem to offer us reliable statements about our bodies and to 
generate actionable knowledge. They thereby offer the facilitation of life-
world contingencies on an individual level. This article argues that this 
strategy of the “privatization of contingency” is accompanied by the increase 
of lifeworld contingency, resulting in a contingency dilemma in contempo-
rary self-tracking that produces (new) dependencies and vulnerabilities with 
respect to the technology used. 
There are three basic levels of contingency that overlap in practices of dig-
ital self-tracking and that stand in opposition to the hope of “objectified”2 
(Zillien, Fröhlich, and Dötsch 2015, 88) measurement of human conduct that 
metric technologies promise: the first level is the epistemic contingency, 
meaning whether or not our world even contains unwavering facts or if all 
assertions of truth are necessarily contingent (Burke 1994).3 
 
1  This contribution was written in the framework of the research project “VALID – Ethical as-
pects of digital self-tracking in the health sector between empowerment and new barriers.” 
We would like to thank the German Federal Ministry of Health (BMG) for its support and fund-
ing. 
2  All quotes have been translated from German by the authors. 
3  Behind the debate about technical contingency in the case of digital self-tracking, there is the 
philosophical question regarding epistemic contingency, a more detailed discussion of which 
would go beyond the scope of this publication: can contingencies be controlled to the point 
that they take on a “humane and social quality” (Dewey 1915, 43), or does every type of con-
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On the second level, the question of epistemic contingency is overlapped 
by the contingency of social facts (Searle 1995; 2011, 85). Cocktail parties, the 
EU, and money as a means of payment are all common elements of the 
social universe; but they only exist because they have been introduced “as 
existing” and acknowledged and treated “as existing” by others. 
The third level expands on epistemic and social contingencies: scientific 
and technological advances continually produce new technological contin-
gencies. Technology in particular produces contingency in the epistemic as 
well as in the social sense (Makropoulos 1997, 151) in that new technology-
based access to the world is being provided (in the past it was the telescope 
and sonar; today it is big data). Long standing ideas are being questioned 
and the increasing mechanization of the world (Jonas 1984, 33) produces 
new complexities. With that, the need to orientate oneself in dealing with 
contingency increases, specifically with reference to man-made – anthropo-
genic – contingency of a world that has been reshaped by technology. 
Everyday practices, like digital self-tracking, are affected by anthropogen-
ic contingency through the increased qualitative and quantitative complexi-
ty (Jochum 1998) of technology. Everyday practices become more efficient 
with technology, but also less transparent in their functions and long-term 
effects. Even if individual contingency of action is successfully reduced with 
digital self-tracking (e.g., a workout plan based on physical data), lifeworld 
contingency increases with the use of a technology that is generally not 
understood by the user. New questions arise: How does the technology 
work? How reliable are the data and suggestions? Do third parties have 
access to the data? Is the device aware of the user’s specific health situation? 
Practices of digital self-tracking that are supposed to supply the user with 
manageable orientation for one’s personal health behaviour using exact 
measurements then lead to a contingency dilemma. Behind this contingen-
cy dilemma there is the general theory that the use of technology to over-
come individual contingency of action implies the reproduction of technolog-
ical contingency, and therefore produces (new) dependencies and 
vulnerabilities with respect to the technology used (Coeckelbergh 2015, 221). 
This contribution focuses on the contingencies in practices of digital self-
tracking, with a methodological focus on the situation of digital self-
tracking. Situation is a methodological term in the sociology of conventions 
(Diaz-Bone 2018, 374) and pragmatism (Dewey 1986, 109-20; Dorstewitz 2011, 
215; Welchman 2002). The expression “situation” describes the “organic” 
constellation of action within an environment characterised by indetermi-
nations within which actors are located and must take decisions on action. 
 
tingency reproduction represent another step “on the road towards a certain kind of mad-
ness” (Russell 1947, 856) that must be overcome? This contention led to Richard Rorty’s neo-
pragmatic concept of a scientific culture embracing contingency (Rorty 1989).  
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Therefore, the examination is not limited to individuals (and their motiva-
tion) or the level of institutions (and their structures). Instead, this contribu-
tion aims to “reconstruct constellations of action from the perspective of 
actors involved in them” (Diaz-Bone 2018, 377) in which both levels overlap 
(if a clear division of the levels even seems reasonable). The reconstruction 
process is borrowed from pragmatic methods (Dewey 1986, 1988). The ob-
jective is to illustrate relevant determinants of decisions on actions in the “sit-
uation” of digital self-tracking and to examine the reproduction or produc-
tion of vulnerabilities. 
The article offers a detailed examination of how vulnerabilities in practic-
es of digital self-tracking develop and to what degree digital self-tracking 
reduces or reproduces contingencies. First, the facilitating function of au-
tomatisms will be described that serve individual contingency reduction, 
followed by a problematization of the use of digital self-tracking for contin-
gency reduction, illustrating the pathologies of lifeworld contingency. 
Whether or not – and how – these pathologies are individually experienced 
will be reviewed based on an empirical study in an ongoing research pro-
ject. Second, users’ approaches to setting boundaries and utilising conven-
tions to overcome the contingency dilemma will be described, concluding 
with an outlook on a possible way to overcome the contingency dilemma in 
digital self-tracking. 
2. Social Contingency and Automatisms in Nature and 
Technology as Facilitation of Contingency 
In a world of constant change, anything that appears unvarying, recurrent, 
and stabilising really stands out. Breathing, heartbeat, and circulation also 
appear to be untouched by contingency of constant change, just as the lu-
minary course, the tides, or the “stubborn, stereotypical, undivertible habits 
of the animals” are (Gehlen 1957, 16). Likewise, routine actions and me-
chanical automatisms seem resonant and produce a fascination in the per-
ceptible similarities of internal and external circuits (that is not a “substan-
tial similarity”; Gehlen 1957, 21). 
Gehlen uses the term resonance (1957, 16) to describe how automatisms 
produce a fascinating stability and dependability through their recurring 
loops and inspire concepts of social facts (Searle 1995; 2011, 85). Astrology 
and horoscopes are social facts that connect the fate of humans to the au-
tomatisms of the celestial orbit and with that relieve people of the “paralysis 
and helplessness in the face of forces of nature” (Gehlen 1957, 18). In the 
development of social ontologies, just as with habits and routines, automa-
tisms facilitate by “becoming self-evident” (Gehlen 1957, 18) through the 
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normalization (Makropoulos 1990, 413) of the lifeworld and production of 
practical effects. 
When external automatisms are linked to the lifeworld of humans, hu-
mans then “transform” recurring “coordinates of the world” that lie beyond 
their powers of influence into “human standards” (Gehlen 1957, 18). The 
constant danger of these strategies of facilitation of contingency lies in the 
exaggeration of the possibilities of interpretation. Humans perform “magic” 
(Gehlen 1957, 14) in that they specifically take things that are beyond their 
reach in order to control contingency, adding social ontologies to the (not 
fully understood) world. The contingency dilemma becomes apparent in 
social ontologies when the validity of social facts (e.g., from astrology, flight 
of birds, etc.) is questioned. If the possibilities of interpretation of a social 
ontology become too exaggerated, they will constantly be in contradiction to 
lifeworld experiences and produce new contingencies instead of providing 
orientation, and in the end will no longer fulfil their facilitating function.  
While in the past, as Gehlen described, ritualized natural practices limited 
contingencies to individual actions and (lifeworld) natural phenomena, with 
the increasing mechanization of the world, individual technical possibilities 
for action (hammer, bow, and arrow) are made to be contingent fields of 
action and contingent horizons of possibilities (tool use, hunting tech-
niques; Makropoulos 1997, 147). Instead of natural automatisms used in a 
“magical” interpretation to reduce contingency, in current practices, con-
trollable technological automatisms can also take on this function of facilita-
tion. As long as technology is not understood, using (theoretically) control-
lable technology is a kind of “magical” practice. 
The contingency dilemma is especially relevant in dealing with the use of 
technology on the human body. Digital assistance systems in the field of 
health and practices of digital self-tracking are individually perceived as the 
facilitation of lifeworld contingency (Biniok and Lettkemann 2017), but they 
lead to the continuity of the dualism of contingency reduction and contin-
gency reproduction, even if it is fed by the fascination with automatisms of 
human-made devices and no longer by the interpretation of natural cycles.  
Drawing parallels between natural magic and technology that is not un-
derstood should not be pushed to extremes. But in both cases, an external 
instance is granted interpretational sovereignty over one’s own actions. In 
both natural magic cults and the use of technological devices, this leads to 
pathologies that will be explained in more detail in the following. 
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3. Technical Contingency in Practices of Digital Self-
Tracking 
Even if the reduction of contingency is successful in individual performed 
actions through the use of technology that is not understood, it is associated 
with an increase in lifeworld contingency. In this context, Klaus Wiegerling 
and Reinhard Heil speak of a “dialectic of facilitation and deprivation of the 
right of decision.” The deprivation of the right of decision takes place “when 
alternatives for action are disregarded through system utilization” (Wieg-
erling and Heil 2019, 225). They take as an example the medical expert sys-
tems that assist doctors, but also limit their discretionary competence, make 
treatment methods that diverge from the system’s suggestions risky for the 
doctor to choose, and increase the lack of transparency of medical diagno-
ses for patients. The dialectic of facilitation and the deprivation of the right 
of decision is an individual phenomenon for a doctor in this example. For 
the affected patient, however, it is perceived as a lifeworld phenomenon of 
increasing opacity. 
This dialectic also applies to the assistance systems for one’s own behav-
iour, like digital self-tracking with fitness trackers, smart watches, and 
health apps. On the one hand, the free democratic order applies, which 
deems of the highest importance the individual right to life and the free 
development. On the other hand, however, free development also implies 
the contingency of possible concepts of life and the self, and with that the 
difficulty of leading one’s “own life.” In order to escape this lifeworld con-
tingency, digital health apps, among other things, offer facilitation for peo-
ple’s own actions, memories, and motivation for activities as well as suppos-
edly “exact” data about one’s own life that are immediately analysed and 
presented (Selke 2016b, 55). 
3.1 Individual Decision-Making Autonomy and Privatization of 
Contingency 
Types of deprivation of the right of decision are harder to trace than facilitation 
functions. First, it must be stated that behind the previously mentioned 
dependency on digital life assistances, there is not only the individual depri-
vation of the right of decision. With the Practice Turn (Simpson 2009) in the 
social and cultural sciences and humanities, the idea of basing autonomy on 
a realm of pure reason made way for locating autonomy within “conven-
tionalised forms of activity in a society” (Geiselhart and Häberer 2019, 113). 
Departing from Kant and Hegel, the early pragmatists (Peirce, Dewey, 
James, Mead) formulated action as a transformative social process that is 
not separate from, but rather is performed in and originates from an envi-
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ronment. Decisions on action are then taken based on a specific position of 
situational rationality (Diaz-Bone 2018, 374). It is the attempt to link theory 
with practice and put less emphasis on the theoretically possible and more 
emphasis on the practically necessary decision-making possibilities and 
therefore on the question of how practices can become theoretically in-
formed, or as John Dewey would say, “intelligent” (Dewey 1988, 134).  
The social and theoretically controllable framework for conditions of ac-
tion then becomes more important, for it determines the amount of leeway 
available for situational rationality. 
From this perspective, the double contingency of technological action is 
not only an individual problem. Both the desire for facilitation of contingen-
cy as well as the associated deprivation of the right of decision can be seen 
as effects of a changed framework system, meaning the manifestation of the 
privatization of contingency (Selke 2016a, 314) in (socially) exhausted societies 
(Lutz 2014). Whether and which contingencies are reproduced or reduced 
does not solely depend on the individual. Instead, existing social structures 
are increasingly influenced or even replaced by technological structures of 
automated digital processes. This change towards a privatization of contin-
gency is expressed, for example, in mechanisms of responsibilization, which 
use technologically mediated (hard) nudges to suggest how to organise one’s 
personal freedom and way of life. In short responsibilization is defined as 
an “obligation for personal responsibility and self-care” (Lutz 2016, 757). 
3.2 The Production of Lifeworld Contingency through the Logic of 
Prevention 
The current prevention discourse can also be categorised under the mecha-
nisms of responsibilization. Against this background, digital data can seem to 
be both disintegrating and disciplining at the same time. Norms that are 
applied to health, health behaviour, and health care generally originate 
from standards that insufficiently take into account the perspective of vul-
nerable groups. Prevention based on a digital image of a “standard human” 
very rarely reflects the actual heterogeneity of the population. This distor-
tion can lead to discriminating refusal of access to health care services.  
Especially in socially exhausted societies and during times of crises, engi-
neered self-care as a new mobilising strategy for prevention is embraced. 
Subjects are easier to influence than systems. People are “troublesome” due 
to their unwillingness or inability to yield to pre-established rules of a sys-
tem, making direct access to the subject so attractive. Subjects’ willingness 
to participate as a limited resource has to be repeatedly re-established at all 
costs; for example, with the use of digital technologies that are user-friendly 
and “attached” to the user, therefore motivating the user to follow its im-
plemented rules.  
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A brief archaeology of the concept of prevention, however, shows the am-
bivalence of the idea of prevention. Here, the canonical understanding is 
especially informative: prevention was understood as the right of the high 
clergy to “dictate the conduct of their subordinates” (Brockhaus 1890). With 
this in mind, prevention can be interpreted as a “sanitary” project, whereby 
everyday and lifeworld structures slowly become rationalized according to 
normative stipulations made by an elite orientated toward efficiency. In-
stead of repressive control from above, a prevention policy established a 
repressive character from below, from the subject itself (Lengwiler and 
Madarasz 2010; Wambach 1983). 
Health insurance companies are now offering programmes that award 
customers with bonuses for achieving health goals and sharing certain fit-
ness data (e.g., AOK-Bonusprogram with a tracking app).4 Preventative 
measures infiltrate the realm of possibilities that is theoretically (according 
to the free democratic order) available to everyone for their personal devel-
opment by shifting institutional health care measures from the institutional-
ly offered “treatment of illness” to the individually demanded “prevention 
and promotion of health” (Gugutzer and Duttweiler 2012, 8). The health care 
service is no longer provided by the health care system, but rather demand-
ed from every individual’s health behaviour. 
If like this the corresponding practices of self-tracking and prevention are 
enforced without question, long-term effects and problems will have to be 
compensated for. For example, the flexible adaptability of the subjects to 
the logic and goals of prevention is being overstrained. The pressure on the 
subjects is an increasing necessity to live up to the demands of preventative 
thinking because the prevention imperatives are presented as based on 
scientific rationality. The appellative nature of the renunciation of personal 
interests (“affluent asceticism”) is increasing while at the same time deci-
sion architectures (“big nudging”) based on algorithms are increasingly 
interfering with everyday routines and instrumentalise people based on 
particular interests. The logic of prevention then represents a type of re-
sponsibilization as a “transition from public to personal safety, from collec-
tive to individual risk management, from state care to self care, from social 
security to personal responsibility” (Lessenich 2010, 564).  
 
4  Cf. The AOK PLUS-Bonusprogram: https://www.aok.de/pk/plus/inhalt/bonusprogramm/ (last 
accessed on 05.09.2019). 
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4. Vulnerabilities and Conventions in the Situation of 
Digital Self-Trackers 
With reference to the contingency dilemma, the situation of digital self-
trackers can be described as conflicting. The basic conflict of a privatization 
of contingency stems from a desire for orientation, stability, and reliable 
effects of personal health practices, which come with detrimental oppor-
tunity costs. Digital tracking-technology offers orientation by presenting 
“precise” numbers and recommended practices for improving health. The 
offered suggestions, however, are norms based on arithmetic means and an 
ideal of an average healthy human, which hardly match any individuals 
health. Vulnerable persons in particular, with chronic diseases, disabilities, 
or in ongoing medical treatment, do not and sometimes never match health 
norms of an idealized average. Stability is offered by fascinating automa-
tisms of data measurement, processing and presentation that seem to facili-
tate from uncertain ideas of personal health, but deprive from evaluating 
one’s health status on their own. The data measured has to be accorded with 
the private perception of health and brings feelings of personal well-being 
in conflict with data points. Reliable effects of personal health practices, 
promised by presenting personal workout plans based on individual fitness 
data, are, in turn, demanded by the logic of prevention and serve as an in-
strument of external control or responsibilization.  
Unlike services from state funded health institutions, individual health 
behaviour is not accompanied by a body of laws regulating and guiding the 
tasks and boundaries of health improvement. To put it pointedly, with the 
“health revolution” (Gugutzer and Duttweiler 2012, 8) from provision of 
health care to prevention and personal responsibility, the desired health 
care service of state institutions are being outsourced to citizens. In this 
indeterminate situation of individual health practices where institutional-
ized frameworks (laws, regulations, minimal standards) are missing or still 
in development, conventions still serve as a baseline for orientation and 
coordination of individual behaviour (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; Diaz-
Bone 2018, 3). As culturally established solutions to coordination problems, 
conventions offer justification and a baseline of coordinated action that can 
be expected from others. Market convention aiming at generation of profit, 
thereby balancing supply and demand, civic society aiming at a certain level 
of well-being for all, or domestic convention aiming at protecting a personal 
realm of recreational activity and creativity that can serve as a “home” – are 
typical repertoires of (moral) justifications that form the basis of institution-
alized frameworks (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). As such, conventions are 
present, even if institutionalized (democratic) guidelines are not and supply 
an orientational framework that digital self-trackers can fall back on. 
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Health and well-being are values of a civic and a vitality repertoire of justi-
fication (Sharon 2018). Healthy employees increase effectivity and profit 
and are valued according to market and industrial repertoires of justifica-
tion (Cappel and Kappler 2019). How individuals are to go about this preven-
tion cannot, however, be stipulated and therefore cannot offer a facilitation 
of contingency through orientation toward laws, norms, and a set of official 
(democratic) rules. First of all, preventive behaviour is always performed ex 
ante, whether the person will have health issues in the long-term or not; 
prevention therefore knows no end nor fixed boundaries to the amount of 
preventive behaviour required to stay healthy. Second of all, mandatory 
preventative measures create conflicts between civic and vitality repertoires 
of justification (Sharon 2018): some health insurance companies promote 
PAYL (pay-as-you-live) services and grant bonuses for sharing private fit-
ness data. Other health insurance companies dismiss it, arguing from the 
repertoire of civic convention: as long as not everyone can participate, it 
must not be used as a comprehensive service offered by health insurance 
companies (Kramer and Jahberg 2016). 
Missing institutionalized frameworks for health apps can also be attribut-
ed to the dynamic state of (industrial) app development. Conventions sup-
port institutionalization, but in the case of digital health apps, the industrial 
convention (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) has not yet developed into official 
“minimum standards” (Bierbaum and Bierbaum 2017, 257). Many health 
apps are developed without input from health experts (Trojan and Kofahl 
2015, 85) and initiatives to create a certification authority for apps (Gießel-
mann 2017; Kramer 2017) are not yet well established.  
Similar to the industrial convention, the market convention (Boltanski and 
Thévenot 2006) has not yet been transformed into institutionalized stand-
ards. Over 200,000 health apps are currently on the market. According to a 
2016 analysis, app developers are unsatisfied with profit margins, pointing 
at a lack of reliable criteria for market control in this sector. Forty-four per-
cent of health apps are offered without payment (Albrecht, Höhn, and von 
Jan 2016, 75-6) and create an unstable market situation in which “the prog-
nosis for the market development of wearables” are considered “diverse and 
partially contradictory” (Meidert et al. 2018, 157). The market for health 
apps has not been consolidated to the point of effecting the establishment of 
frameworks for orientation and contingency reduction for the individual 
user (laws, declarations of self-regulation, official certificates, etc.), rather 
the conventions behind the market situation are in active negotiation. 
With a lacking establishment of (industry) quality standards for health 
apps, effectivity that has not yet been proven in long-term studies, the di-
verse and unassisted use of self-tracking apps in the leisure sector, missing 
institutionalization of coordinating norms from market conventions, and a 
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lack of legislature framework, there is little that can hinder mechanisms of 
prevention from delegating demands for health practices to the user.  
4.1 Privatization of Contingency 
Strategies of coping with contingencies become conflicting when the de-
sired positive effects of digital self-tracking have not yet been scientifically 
established (Trojan and Kofahl 2015, 85; Seto et al. 2012), but a “probabilistic 
predicable event” is nonetheless interpreted as a “consciously taken risk.” 
Predictable risks can therefore  
be pushed to the area of responsibility of the decision-maker, even when 
the risk prognosis has nothing to do with the individual, but only with ag-
gregated collectives. Situations in which decisions are made that are de-
fined by probabilistic risks therefore take an event that someone may pos-
sibly experience in the future and turn it into an event that can be 
attributed to the situation as a consequence of the decision. (Samerski and 
Henkel 2015, 91) 
The expectation of a possible event becomes radically individualised.  
Digital self-tracking technologies do not only produce trivial contingen-
cies, although – just as with any new technology – it inevitably results in new 
possibilities for action and therefore uncertainty and contingencies. In fact, 
digital self-tracking allows specific contingency production of possible futures 
based on measured data that adds the pressure to conform to the ideas and con-
siderations about the possibilities of one’s own life.  
By presenting supposed “exact data” of one’s own body via digital self-
tracking devices and deriving feedback about one’s health condition and 
suggestions about what to do from this data, possible futures appear to be 
more likely than they realistically are. The zenith of this development are 
great promises that are made by apps such as Life Clock (thelife 
clockapp.com), which offers “calculations” of the user’s life expectancy 
down to the second. Preventative activities, such as jogging, are then metic-
ulously added to the amount of lifetime left. The metric life expectancy 
provides supposed stability, putting an exact date on the user’s own death, 
which is something existentially unfathomable. The Life Clock technology 
makes a promise of the future, it is a “prophetic technology” (Achatz 2019) 
that lessens fears of the future, exaggerates the actual possibilities to control 
one’s own life expectancy, and meets the latent pressure of prevention logic 
with concrete numbers (Selke 2016a, 314-5). 
Because the predictions are based on “exact data” from the sphere of life-
world contingencies, it is precisely the prophetic aspect of technology that 
allows the creation of popularised responsibilising strategies. Users can 
liberate themselves from their individual contingency of their health behav-
iour through the tangible stability of automatically generated health data, 
thereby making a pact with machines that produce contingencies: unlike 
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medical treatment, there is generally no end to prevention, resulting in a 
continual obligation to perform preventive health activities, justified by 
pointing towards “objective” health data. 
How do users then regulate their use of digital self-tracking? Are the life-
world effects of contingency that result from a prophetic technology per-
ceived as destabilizing, or is the joy in experiencing the stabilizing automa-
tism of the generation of health data more predominant? 
4.2 User Perspectives on the Contingency Dilemma in Digital Self-
Tracking 
In an empirical study we examine the gradual transformation of vulnerabili-
ties and new possibilities of literacy.5 A user survey from April 2018 to April 
2019 aimed to find out how contingencies in user behaviour affected the 
sharing of user’s health data.  
The goal was to examine contingencies in the use of digital self-tracking 
beyond the self-tracking scenes that are already well researched, such as the 
Quantified Self Movement (Ajana 2018; Lupton 2016). The sociology of con-
ventions allows identifying modes of orientation and options for overcom-
ing the contingency dilemma in digital self-tracking even when institutional-
ized frameworks are absent. A theory of convention presupposes existing 
moral capabilities of solving coordination problems. It is in line with evolu-
tionary biologists who argue human morality developed exactly for solving 
problems of cooperation and coordination among humans, allowing for 
shared intentionality and social coordination (Tomasello 2015, 2019). To 
what extent and how digital self-trackers make use of value frameworks to change 
their indeterminate situation and counter privatization of contingency are exam-
ined in close detail. The “reconstruction of the empirically available moral 
systems that underlie economic coordination” (Diaz-Bone 2018, 145), but 
likewise sustain civic, industrial, and vitality convention (Cappel and Kap-
pler 2019), are the social-theoretical pillars of convention theory that will be 
referred to in the following.  
The contingency dilemma will be reconstructed based on “constellations 
from the point of view of involved agents” (Diaz-Bone 2018, 377). How do 
users regulate and justify their digital self-tracking practices? Which con-
ventions are available for users, vulnerable persons in particular, for orien-
tation? Are available conventions experienced in a mode of conflict or do 
they offer empowerment? In qualitative interviews, mainly classically vul-
nerable people (chronically ill people, people with disabilities) and for com-
 
5  “VALID – Ethical aspects of digital self-tracking in the health sector between empowerment 
and new barriers,” funded by the German Federal Ministry of Health (BMG). See: https://www. 
hs-furtwangen.de/en/research/forschungsprojekte/valid/. 
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parison a number of resilient people (athletes, people who self-track in their 
leisure time) were asked about their experience with health-related digital 
self-tracking, confirming some aspects that (according to Gehlen) can be 
classified as a facilitating function through automatisms, or the reduction of 
contingency. 
4.2.1 Facilitation of Contingency 
Self-tracking provides the feeling of security through automated and there-
fore stable and seemingly exact data that stand out from the contingency of 
the individual and inconsistent health situation. Users can get “numbers 
that say […] I was really lazy today” (D1_2). 
The increased feeling of security is also an effect of a chain of processes: 
the security of automatic data collection, analysis, and presentation and the 
resulting suggestions for health behaviour facilitates the contingency of 
uncertain health conditions. The user wants to know if the way their “body 
feels corresponds with what […] the watch actually measured” (B1_4).  
Just like rituals, reliably repeated automatisms are all the more meaningful 
when they can be compared to the provided health standards (e.g., walking 
10,000 steps a day) or other users’ data, therefore creating a recurring data 
cycle. These automatisms also have an effect on the user’s self-perception 
because they offer them points of reference with regards “to which extent 
[…] one’s own perception is skewed or not” (B1_6). 
Now I’m going out with my devices again because I always go jogging with 
my dog in the morning. And I take what feels like a trip around the world. 
I was really astonished to find out how short the jog really was, although it 
feels so long. I need to adjust my perspective of reality a little with num-
bers and measurements. (B1_1) 
Digital self-tracking applications communicate standards to their users and 
allow silent or visible (through data entry) participation in health rituals. 
This results in scalable comparisons for the users, both on the peer group 
level and “on an international level […]: And then you see how you’re 
ranked” (B1_6). 
The validity of these standards, however, have not been unequivocally cer-
tified, and the users are instead “not really aware of how the (tracking de-
vice) actually gets the numbers” (C1_10). This ignorance is partially com-
pensated for with speculation: the fitness tracker must “somehow do it 
according to my pulse. Then probably, I guess, using a movement sensor” 
(C1_10).  
Automatisms of personal data analysis produce a resonance (Gehlen 1957, 
16) that, beyond the specific benefit, additionally produces a fascination 
(Gehlen 1957; Lee et al. 2018, 8), as illustrated by the following interview 
excerpt: 
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Well I am fascinated for example by this: when I swim for a while with it 
on, it’s completely waterproof. And for example at the end it says which 
swimming stroke I used and how long I swam. How many calories I 
burned. That kind of fascinates me. That’s why I used it a lot in the begin-
ning. (C1_10) 
4.2.2 Reproduction of Contingency 
Opposite the individual reduction of contingency are the lifeworld contin-
gencies that arise, for example because the communicated standards do not 
always correspond with the health situation of the user and then lead to the 
exclusion from practices of comparison with other users. For example, limi-
tations such as an “injured knee” are not taken into consideration because 
“healthy people” are the standard (C1_16). This leads to the reality that 
“physically […] limited” people cannot “compare (themselves) with a 
healthy person” (A1_3_1). This pre-standardization then appears to be a 
criterion for exclusion for vulnerable groups: 
And the app doesn’t know that I am still on medication. That means that I 
have to exercise differently, or that I have to be in a different heart rate 
zone than someone who isn’t taking medication. And all of that isn’t in-
cluded in an app. Especially for people who aren’t yet that fit. These apps 
might be a little too hard and too standardised. (D1_2) 
The uncertainty about both the data collection as well as its storage and the 
further use (“black box”) were key issues in the interviews: an app’s evalua-
tion of the individual sensitivities, such as the restfulness of sleep, was ques-
tioned. A discrepancy arises between self-perception: “Because I thought I 
slept well”; and the measured results: “Why is it telling me that I slept poor-
ly?” (C1_7). The tracked data therefore serves as a “good indicator” that can 
give orientation, but users would not “fully rely” on them (B1_6). 
Concerning the users’ lack of knowledge with regards to data collection 
and use it was said: “That the data is saved on some servers that I don’t have 
any control over. And yeah, I actually have no idea what happens with the 
data” (C1_8). They make assumptions to compensate for this lack of 
knowledge: “I heard that the data is collected and then actual profiles are 
created” (C1_7).  
The measurements are often opaque and do not help the user to better un-
derstand digital self-tracking technology. Quality criteria, such as those that 
serve as a foundation for empirical research, rarely come into play. Some 
users criticise the reliability of the measurements because they have “little 
faith” in the “exact measurements” apps present, an example of which are 
“calories burned,” which is calculated based on different factors, such as 
“muscle mass” (D1_2). Users question both the technical generation and the 
usefulness of the calculated values because the devices’ “black boxing” pre-
vent the user from knowing how they are calculated: “Regarding the actual 
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interplay of factors, that (the app) really knows how I am sleeping based on 
my heart rate or movement. I don’t really know much about the technical 
aspects” (C1_10). For some users the “display of some measurements” has 
no added value on its own: “I might as well not have them (the measure-
ments), I would still just be standing alone in the forest” (P2). 
The feeling of being observed or evaluated with digital self-tracking makes 
users feel insecure because it shows the contradiction between self-efficacy 
and heteronomy. Users differentiate between the desired effects, such as 
support and motivation for exercising, and the undesired effects, such as 
control and surveillance through the apps: 
I want the device to help me somehow, or motivate me, or do something 
for me. But I don’t want to be tracked around the clock. (D1_2) 
This aversion to control and surveillance is explicated in the “fear of data 
storage,” which for some users outweighs the advantages of the applications 
(P6). 
4.3  Vulnerability and Digital Self-Tracking 
The contingency dilemma of the reduction of individual contingencies of 
action and the (re)production of lifeworld contingencies can therefore be 
found in self-tracking applications for activities in everyday life and specific 
actions. This can be observed in statements regarding users’ fascination 
with technology, on the one hand, and the opacity of the same technology, 
on the other hand, which extend to users’ feelings of insecurity. Considering 
the above mentioned opacity regarding the values that are produced “in the 
app” and the “black box” of the technical processing of one’s own health 
data, digital self-tracking applications themselves produce new lifeworld 
contingencies and insert themselves into everyday life not without friction, 
but as a disruptive technology (Selke 2016a, 310; Swan 2013). 
Motivated by the fascination with technical automatisms and demands to 
optimise one’s own health behaviour based on the logic of prevention, digi-
tal self-tracking apps contribute to the reduction of individual contingency. 
Adopting calls to action given by a technological device that is opaque in its 
functionalities and the use of personal and health data tends to lead to the 
deprivation of the user’s right of decision. An area of lifeworld contingency 
is produced within which the logics of prevention undisputedly reign. Peo-
ple who are vulnerable due to illness, injury, or handicap are particularly 
excluded from the image of a “healthy standard person” and indicate that 
devices’ data and their own physical condition are incompatible. However, they 
paradoxically continue using digital self-tracking apps. 
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4.4 Digital Self-Tracking and Regimes of Engagement 
Due to the lack of reasonable guidelines, however, convention theory is 
valid here because users themselves set boundaries (Plessner 2003) and, es-
pecially on the moral level and with respect to the user’s individual situation 
(situational rationality), develop their own solutions to the coordination 
problem of contingency in individual health practices that do not, however, 
approach the stabilising degree of coordinated and cooperative action that 
extend beyond a local regime of engagement (Thévenot 2010, 11).  
In terms of facilitation and the deprivation of the right of decision, the range 
of individual coping mechanisms can be observed through which individu-
als try to protect and secure personal values and which approaches there 
are to establish frameworks from conventions through a cooperative and 
coordinated change to the situation of digital self-trackers. 
The users’ quotes that serve to illustrate this issue thereby follow a sys-
tematic according to the type of dependency (device, group, network tech-
nology), or setting of boundaries to avoid it, and show types of (moral) 
judgement about how to deal with one’s own data (self-reference, group-
reference, general social reference). 
4.4.1 External Boundaries 
In the leisure sector, apps serve to guide action. The app’s demands are 
adopted particularly in cases where the user’s own health expertise is not 
sufficient enough to determine for themselves what healthy behaviour is. 
Answering the question of how important the demands of the app are, one 
user stated: “It really is important, because, like, I don’t know what I should 
do to lose weight” (C1_11). Some users internalise this action orientation to 
the point that it becomes a type of compulsion, and a “sense of obligation” 
results from the use: 
It almost feels like an obligation. Like at that moment I have to swim two 
more laps. Otherwise, and this is exaggerated, I would disappoint the 
watch. (C1_10)  
Athletes, however, take orders from coaches or trainers who design 
workout plans. They do not regulate how data are used; rather they rely on 
the demands of the trainer. Digital self-tracking apps serve the purpose of a 
coaching instrument in that they manage training schedules, delegate tasks 
to the athlete, document and analyse performance, and provide feedback 
for the trainer: 
The heart rate zone was set by the coach and performance tests. And train-
ing plans were designed based on that. And those are the workouts you do. 
So it was really mandatory to have a chest strap! (A1_1) 
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With regards to data protection and sharing personal information, some 
users stand out because they do not set any boundaries and think the protec-
tion of their data is irrelevant. They assign very little value to their personal 
health data. Interestingly, this type of user generally presents arguments for 
this degree of indifference. They do state concerns, but also that they have 
not personally had negative experiences. These users are often uncritical of 
the commercialization of their data (e.g., personalised ads), with opinions of 
it ranging from “not troubling” to “often quite practical” (A1_1). Sometimes 
this indifference towards data protection is very directly expressed: “And 
with my health data, for me that is almost less important […] it even doesn’t 
matter. If someone wants to use it, they should do whatever they want with 
it” (A1_1); or simple yet concise: “data protection: well, I don’t really care 
about it!” (C1_16). 
4.4.2 Self-Limitation 
The adoption of external demands is faced with measures of self-limitation, 
and users establish boundaries when they find an app to be invasive and, 
therefore, when it causes them to feel insecure. An example of this is the 
constant control and evaluation of apps: 
You can get kind of too obsessive about it, sometimes! And then it was get-
ting on my nerves. Always looking at it. You are constantly looking to see 
how [many calories] you have burned, what am I still allowed to eat? What 
do I still have to eat? You put a lot of pressure on yourself. (C1_18) 
Some only use digital self-tracking “for themselves” and do not let the data 
of others influence them. These users choose to opt out of the comparative 
function that is often a key element of digital self-tracking. For these users, 
it’s about competition: 
I don’t necessarily want to compare myself to others. I have my own aspi-
rations for myself. Whether or not someone shares these aspirations is 
their own business. Because when you start comparing yourself, then it 
starts to become a competition and then you say: Oh, now I have to get in 
5,000 more steps today. (A1_3_1) 
Besides the mere personal use of the data, other users share their data in 
exercise groups or among their friends and family, but they draw the line at 
sharing their data on Facebook or elsewhere. Whether or not users in the 
group are strangers or not is also a criterion: “Well if there is a stranger in 
the group, [then] I don’t like to [share] the information” (B1_3).  
A clear connection to moral values is found in the attempt to reduce one’s 
own opacity (a key term here: transparent citizen) by entering false infor-
mation and therefore creating a more or less fake user profile and, if not 
protecting, at least obscuring privacy. Measures such as choosing pseudo-
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nyms with “nicknames” (B1_2) or “fake names” (C1_15), or entering false 
personal information are commonly used by different users: 
The Google account has already been set up with age and name anyway. 
The age is wrong anyway. (D1_1) 
Boundaries are sometimes set (e.g., not using a certain app) due to specific 
concerns about equal treatment and privacy. These reflected concerns are 
less informed by moral assessments (intuitive feelings, rule of thumb), but 
rather by ethical principles (fairness, equality). One example is the previously 
mentioned PAYL health insurance programme that calculates insurance 
rates based on digitally gathered health data: 
For example, it’s also possible to use the apps by the health insurance 
companies. I wouldn’t do that either because then I would always be afraid 
that there would be rewards! If you walk 10,000 steps a day then you get 
this or that reward, and then have to pay less money. And those are things 
where I think, yeah, maybe one person cannot do that but another person 
can! So yeah I am actually afraid that my health insurance company will 
start using that someday (A1_3_1). 
So, there are different decision-making strategies and degrees of setting 
boundaries to avoid the contingencies of the indeterminate situation of 
digital self-tracking that make users feel insecure. Some users even find the 
use of self-tracking devices to be an obligation. Others find the motivational 
character of devices alone to be a compulsion that makes them feel inse-
cure. At the group level, either collective practices of an exercise group are 
adopted or users try to avoid the competitive character of a data-sharing 
group. On the general societal level are the general impacts of self-tracking, 
such as profiling, calculating health insurance rates, and the trading of 
health data. Here, there are two user fractions: one that is generous with 
their data, and one that is restrictive with their data and rejects the use of 
self-tracking due to ethical concerns regarding fairness or equality. 
This division illustrates that moral values are being negotiated, defended, 
or discarded, but that there are almost no initiatives beyond the use or non-
use of apps to change the situation of digital self-trackers; in fact, bounda-
ries are set more through self-restriction and less, if at all possible, through 
control of the technology (“black box”). A particularity here is the common 
practice of entering false names and contact information, which has the 
same effect as rule-oriented, coordinated action (less transparency of per-
sonal data, hindering profile building) but do not become cooperative action 
(networking with others, developing norms, and establishing formalised 
conventions). This is a practice on the margins of political action as it has a 
collective effect and therefore helps shape the face of the polis and coexist-
ence, but is closed to any contribution to politics in its non-collectivization and 
non-publicness (Marchart 2010; Braun 2018). 
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Especially in cases of the comprehensive use of digital self-tracking, such 
as by health insurance companies, there are not only the dangers of a 
breakdown of solidarity through the unequal advantages and disadvantages 
regarding demands of prevention as discussed in the literature, but there is 
also a lack of politization. Problems such as the unequal access and use of 
digital self-tracking, opacity of the applications and their values (“black 
box”), uncertainty through opaque “fitness data,” and opaque use of person-
al data from self-trackers remain in an unregulated sphere that will remain 
closed to discourse and regulation as long as there is no explicit public co-
operation and cannot, therefore, enter in democratic processes of decision 
making. While users are to a minor degree trying to change the social 
framework of the use of digital self-tracking (e.g., by entering false personal 
information), they are not trying to change the technology, but are taking 
personal steps to set boundaries. 
5. Conclusion 
Individual contingency of action can be reduced through digital self-
tracking; however, this produces or reproduces lifeworld contingencies. 
The less the technology used is understood in its functioning, the greater 
increase in contingency. Criteria that can be applied for this increase are the 
technical literacy, analogue to health literacy, meaning the ability to find, 
understand, assess, and successfully use information on technical systems. 
The “black box,” however, particularly prevents the understanding of the 
technology. Users’ assessments of the applications of digital self-trackers are 
also extremely varying and range from dependencies (“I don’t know what I 
should do to lose weight.” (C1_11)) to self-limitation (“I started taking it off 
because sometimes it just became too much with all the data.” (C1_7)) and 
complete non-use of applications for ethical reasons. Instead of increasing 
their own personal control over the digital self-tracking application (e.g., by 
demanding app developers provide more comprehensive options and set-
tings), users limit their own actions. Problematic “profile creation” is made 
more difficult by users entering false personal information. However, be-
yond that, this action achieves neither a coordination among users that 
establishes regulations and transforms conventions into official frameworks 
(or laws), nor a public within which the problems and interests of the users 
can become visible and politically effective. As a consequence, the patholog-
ical effects of digital self-tracking remain invisible, ranging from silent work-
ings of the logic of prevention, responsibilization strategies, and dependencies to 
the exclusion of vulnerable users.  
Exact digital information processing technologies do not offer the “stub-
born” facts (Russell 1947, 853) that Russell was hoping for. As long as num-
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bers are generated by a “black box,” they can only reduce individual contin-
gencies of action, but they cannot contribute to the transparency of the 
world. Dewey’s hope that a “humane and social quality” (1915, 43) can be 
gained from contingency also cannot be realised as long as the use of digital 
self-tracking remains pre-collectivized, just as the health app market is still 
lacking established frameworks for contingency reduction, therefore keeping 
closed the sphere of public democratic mechanisms of cooperation and 
coordination as well as participative negotiation of values. 
Our proposed solution is to overcome pre-collectivization and open chan-
nels for the expression of user needs in order for them to partake in shaping 
the technology without having the same technical expertise as the develop-
ers, thereby diminishing the hierarchical relations in which the effects of 
the logic of prevention can dominate. Vulnerabilities created by the un-
wanted use of data by third-parties, dependency on developer’s require-
ments regarding the control of one’s own data, the exclusion of users be-
yond the “healthy standards” (chronically ill, people with physical 
disabilities, etc.), the invasive insecurity through opacity of the produced 
data, and the further processing of that data could at least be reduced and in 
the long-term lead to more control over one’s own data, increased expertise, 
the freedom of personal development, and, last but not least, experiencing 
self-efficacy through democratic participation. 
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